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Abstract
This paper focuses on the time allocation of spouses and the impact of eco-
nomic variables. We present a stylized model of the time allocation of spouses
to illustrate the expected impact of wages and non-labour income. The empirical
model simultaneously specifies three time-use choices -paid work, childcare, and
housework- and wage and employment equations for each spouse, allowing for cor-
relation across the errors of the ten equations. We exploit the rich information in
the French time-use survey 1998-99 to estimate the model. The predictions of the
theoretical model are mostly validated with the main exception of the standard hy-
pothesis that performing housework does not bring utility. Parents’ market time
responds positively to changes in own wage. The own-wage elasticity of house-
work is negative while childcare does not react to changes in own wage. Women’s
non-market time is independent of their husband’s wage; but both housework
and childcare of fathers react positively to an increase in their wife’s wage. Non-
labour income reduces paid work by parents and increases their non-market time.
Higher-educated and older parents spend more time with their children. There are
significant and positive correlations across the errors of the spousal equations.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the time allocation of spouses in two-parent households and the
impact of economic incentives. Conventional economic models of household behaviour
ignore non-market activities, implicitly assuming that they are equivalent to pure leisure
time. Pioneering work in this area, introducing the concept of household production
and the choice of time allocation is due to Becker (1965, 1981) and Gronau (1976).
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) present a structural model of time allocation of couples
disaggregating non-market work into many separate categories, like, notably, childcare.
More recently, Apps and Rees (1996, 1997 and 2002) introduce household production
in a collective household model, arguing that non-market activities are clearly distinct
from leisure; and Apps (2003) points out that implicitly setting non-market work equal
to ‘leisure’ likely biases conventional labour-supply elasticities. Chiappori (1997) allows
for home production in the collective model of household behaviour.
The empirical literature on the time allocation decisions of spouses within the same
household and the impact of economic incentives is still scarse, especially as many time-
use surveys do not collect any information on wages and income. Some exceptions are
Kalenkoski, Ribar and Stratton (2008), who estimate the impact of wages on the childcare
time of British parents, concluding that while women’s time allocation to paid work and
childcare responds to own and cross (spouse’s) wage, that of men is not responsive to
own wage. Connelly and Kimmel (2007) investigate spousal leisure, home production and
childcare and the impact of wages for American households, making special assumptions
to get round the fact that in the American Time Use Survey the time-diary was collected
for only one respondent in each household. Hersch and Stratton (1994) use a global
time-use question from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate
the relationship between spouses’ housework and wages, ﬁnding evidence of a vicious
circle of wages and housework for women: they do more housework because their wage
is lower than their husbands, and doing housework lowers their wage further. All of
the earlier studies allow wages to aﬀect spousal time allocation by instrumenting or
predicting wages, to our knowledge. In this paper, instead, we model simultaneously the
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wage rates, the employment, and the time allocation of spouses.
We here set up a stylized theoretical model of parents’ utility maximization that
enables us to determine the theoretical predictions concerning the wage and income re-
sponses of spouses’ supply of market and non-market time. This issue is particularly
relevant for policy purposes as wages and non-labour income can be aﬀected by pol-
icy measures like minimum wages, income taxation and various types of governement
subsidies. We separate non-market work into leisure time, childcare and housework.
This latter includes activities such as shopping, cleaning, doing the laundry, washing up
the dishes, doing paperwork and going to administrative oﬃces. The utility individuals
derive from performing these activities is likely to diﬀer to that from caring for their
children. We assume, as conventional in most of the literature in this area, that spouses
derive no utility from performing housework: an assumption which is actually rejected
according to the estimation results. On the contrary, parents are expected to value the
time they spend caring for their children. Further to this, parental time with children
is likely to add to the children’s human capital, producing thus extra rewards for caring
parents.
The empirical model is suﬃciently general that we can test for the validity of the
theoretical model’s predictions. We allow simultaneously for a three-fold time use choice
of spouses within each household; wage and employment equations for each spouse are
also estimated simultaneously, allowing for correlations between the errors of the ten
equations. This allow us to test for the impact of own and cross wage rates, as well
as for non-labour income eﬀects, on spousal time allocation decisions. In addition to
this, we investigate how wages and non-labour income aﬀect the total time spent at the
household level (by the two spouses in each household) on a given activity -which is quite
new in the literature, to our knowledge.
We also allow for possible correlation of the unobservable components of the time
allocation choices of the parents. Correlations in unobservables may capture factors
like positive assortative mating and/or polarization of spouses’ behaviour due to unob-
servable characteristics. For example, individuals may marry others who have similar
(unobservable) characteristics -reﬂecting positive assortative mating- or both parents
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may like to work longer hours in market work -in line with the polarization of long hours
of work at the household level, and contrary to the ‘specialization’ of one spouse in mar-
ket work and the other in housework. Further to this, if unobservable components of
the time allocated to caring for children by parents are positively correlated, then some
couples will spend increasingly more time on children than others. Since time spent
with children by parents very likely adds to the children’s human capital, this may in-
crease overall inequality, especially if it is the higher educated that spend more time on
childcare -which is what we actually ﬁnd, in line with the applied literature in this area.
This model is substantially more general than earlier empirical studies in this area.
We use information on market wages and household non-labour income, which is also
new in the empirical literature, since few time-use datasets contain all of these variables
as well as collecting diary information on both spouses’ time choices. We exploit the
richness of information collected by the French time-use survey 1998-99 to estimate the
model. This has the advantage of including individual earnings, usual hours of work and
total household income, in addition to diary information on how household members
allocate their time to diﬀerent activities. The time diary was collected for all individuals
in the household, so we have time-use information for both spouses in the couple.
The predictions of the theoretical model are mostly validated in the empirical estima-
tion with the main exception of the standard hypothesis that performing housework does
not bring utility. Parents’ market time responds positively to changes in own wage, as
expected, but not to cross-wages. The cross-wage elasticities of market time are negative,
as predicted by the theory, but not signiﬁcant. The own-wage elasticity of housework of
fathers is negative, as expected, and the cross-wage elasticity is statistically signiﬁcant
and positive. Housework of women falls as their wage increases, in line with the theo-
retical predictions, and it does not depend on the husband’s wage. Childcare time of
mothers is not sensitive to wage incentives. Instead, an increase in the mother’s wage
results in more childcare time and housework of fathers. Non-labour income reduces
the time allocated to paid work and increases spouses’ housework and childcare time.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive correlations across the errors of the two spouses’ child-
care equations, within each household. The estimation results indicate also that higher
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educated and older parents spend more time with their children. Finally, we ﬁnd that
women’s housework rises signiﬁcantly with formal marriage.
According to international comparisons (OECD, 2001), French husbands perform less
of non-market activities than men in many other OECD countries. On the other hand,
participation rates in market and non-market work of French women are more or less in
line with those in most other OECD countries. It is hard to say a priori whether our
estimates can be generalized to other countries, as, moreover, the results are conditional
on the quality of the speciﬁc data to hand. It is also diﬃcult to compare our estimated
elasticites to those from earlier studies that adopted a diﬀerent methodology, since they
were also based on diﬀerent countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the theoretical set-
up. The empirical model is speciﬁed next, and the data are described. In the following
sections, we provide some descriptive statistics and comment on the model-estimation
results. The last section concludes the paper.
2 A theoretical framework of time allocation within
the household
2.1 The basic model
We write down a stylized model for the allocation of spouses’ time, distinguishing be-
tween the time allocated to paid work, housework, childcare, and ‘pure’ leisure. Let us
use the following notation, with k = m for husbands, and f for wives:
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Ck private consumption of household member k
Chh (public) consumption of goods produced with housework time
Cch (public) consumption of goods produced with childcare time
Chm housework services bought from the market
Ccm childcare services bought from the market
t1k time spent on paid work by household member k
t2k time spent on housework by household member k
t3k time spent on children by household member k
lk leisure time of household member k
wk hourly wage rate of household member k
ph market price of housework services
pc market price of childcare services
µ household non-labour income
We assume that each household member has private consumption Ck, but that house-
work and childcare services are public goods for the household. The total consumption
of housework Ch consists of services Chh, produced with household time inputs, and
services bought from the market Chm:
1
Ch = Chm + Chh (1)
Similarly, we write household consumption of child care as:
Cc = Ccm + Cch (2)
Home-produced housework Chh can be expressed as the output of a production function,
gh, with time inputs, t2k:
2
Chh = gh(t2m, t2f) (3)
The household childcare production function (Cch) is then:
Cch = gc(t3m, t3f) (4)
1 Note that Equation 1 assumes that housework services produced at home or bought in the market
are perfect substitutes. This assumption can easily be relaxed, for instance by writing Ch = Chm +
θChh, where θ is a preference parameter. To generalize further, we may include Chm and Chh as
separate arguments in the utility function, thereby allowing them to be imperfect substitutes or even
complements. The same remarks apply to Equation 2.
2 We apply the regularity condition that the marginal productivity of the time inputs is positive and
decreasing, as in Gronau (1976). The time inputs represent the household production technology. We
do not allow for more variation in marginal productivities of household production (see Apps, 2003, for
a discussion).
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Household members derive utility from private consumption and public consumption of
housework and childcare. In addition, their utility is inﬂuenced by the time they spend
on children, and their ‘pure’ leisure time:
Uk(Ck, Ch, Cc, t3k, lk), k = m, f (5)
As is usual, we assume that utility is increasing in all of its arguments. By including
time allocated to caring for children in the utility function, we explicitly allow for the
possibility that parents derive utility from the time spent on this activity, in addition to
the services Cch derived from this activity (see Equations 2 and 4). We do not explicitly
include the time spent on housework in the utility function, as we assume that spouses
derive no direct utility from this activity but only from the services generated by it,
Chh.
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The total time endowment (say 24 hours) of each household member k is T and the
time constraint is:
T =
3∑
l=1
tlk + lk, k = m, f (6)
Given the wage rate, wj , and household non-labour income, µ, the household budget
constraint is:
Cm + Cf + phChm + pcCcm = wmt1m + wf t1f + µ (7)
The household welfare function, V (.), can be seen as a weighted average of the indi-
vidual utility function for each household member:
V (Cm, Cf , Ch, Cc, t3m, t3f , lm, lf) =
= λUm(Cm, Ch, Cc, t3m, lm) + (1− λ)Uf(Cf , Ch, Cc, t3f , lf) (8)
The value of λ represents the bargaining power of one spouse relative to the other. In
the collective model, the weight λ depends on the husband’s and wife’s wage rates, and
on the household’s non-labour income.4
3 The time spent on housework thus enters the model in the same way as paid work in the conventional
labour supply model.
4 In addition, λ may depend on ‘distribution factors’ that affect bargaining power but not individ-
ual utility. Pollak (2005) shows how wage rates affect bargaining power of spouses in a model that
incorporates household production.
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The objective of the household is to maximize household welfare (8) subject to the
constraints (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7). Solving the model (see Appendix A) provides
us with the spouses’ optimal time-choice equations:
t∗jk = tjk(wm, wf , µ, ph, pc), k = m, f ; j = 1, 2, 3 (9)
The demand functions for housework time and child care services bought from the
market are then:
C∗hm = Chm(wm, wf , µ, ph, pc)
C∗cm = Ccm(wm, wf , µ, ph, pc)
(10)
These are not observed.5 This basic model does not allow for dynamics or intertemporal
maximization. We also do not model time inputs of adults other than the parents, such as
grandparents or the children themselves, which may contribute to household production.
2.2 The effect of wages and income on the time allocation of
spouses
Table 1 summarizes the expected eﬀects of wages and (non-labour) income on parents’
time-allocation choices. We have split these eﬀects up into ‘substitution’ and ‘income’
eﬀects (see Appendix A for more details). We start by discussing the eﬀect of an increase
in the husband’s wage rate wm on the time spent on housework. This latter can be solved
separately from the rest of the model: the amount of time allocated to housework by
each parent k is such that its marginal productivity is equal to the ratio of the wage of
spouse k to the market price of housework services (see Equation 23 in Appendix A).
Under the assumption of positive and decreasing marginal productivity of housework
done by parents, the husband will spend less time on housework as his own wage rises.
The cross-wage eﬀect on the wife’s housework depends on the production technology
(Equation 3). If husband’s and wife’s time spent on housework are complements in
production, then the wife’s time may also fall. If, instead, they are substitutes, the time
she spends on housework will increase. If they are unrelated, because, for example, she
specializes in household production, then her time is unaﬀected. The income eﬀect of
5 In the econometric specification, we allow for cross correlations in the unobservables of the time-use
equations, which may partly capture omitted heterogeneity in market prices across households.
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a wage increase on time spent on housework is zero.6 The income eﬀect will increase
the consumption of housework services Cc, but this increase comes from an increase in
housework services bought from the market. The substitution eﬀect will increase the
opportunity cost of the husband’s non-market time and reduce that of his spouse. The
substitution eﬀect is thus negative for the husband’s non-market activities, and positive
for the wife’s non-market activities. This is equivalent to saying that paid work time
will increase for the husband and decrease for the wife.
Childcare time enters both the production function of child services and the utility
function. The conventional substitution eﬀect is negative, because child-care time for the
husband becomes more expensive relative to the wife’s. Thus, the husband will spend
less time on childcare and the wife more. The eﬀect that runs through the production
function is also negative for the husband. For the wife, it depends on whether husband’s
and wife’s time in childcare production are complements or substitutes (see above). The
income eﬀect will increase ‘pure’ leisure time and the time spent on children, provided
that children are normal goods.
The total expected eﬀects of wages and income on time allocation are shown in the
lower part of Table 1. Theory unambiguously predicts negative eﬀects of husband’s
wages on paid work of the wife and housework time of the husband. There are opposing
income and substitution eﬀects for the husband’s paid work and time he spends caring
for his children. The eﬀects of husband’s wages on the time that the wife spends on
housework and childcare are not unambiguously signed from theory.
The eﬀects of an increase in the wage rate of the wife mirror those for her husband,
since there is no a priori gender specialization in the model.
An increase in non-labour income is equivalent to the income eﬀects already discussed.
The model predicts unambiguous eﬀects of non-labour income on time-allocation choices:
paid work will fall, and childcare time will rise. The zero eﬀect for housework time results
from the assumption that housework time does not enter the utility function explicitly,
and that housework services bought from the market and produced at home are perfect
6 This can easily be seen by noting that the solution of Equation 23 is independent of non-labour
income.
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substitutes.
3 The empirical model
The econometric model is suﬃciently general that we can test for the validity of the
predictions of the theoretical model summarized in Table 1. No speciﬁc assumptions
from the theoretical model (as, for instance, a zero income eﬀect for housework) are
imposed on the structure of the empirical model. The estimation of a structural model
is not feasible since we have insuﬃcient information on the market quantities and prices
of housework and childcare.
We simultaneously model three time-allocation decisions -market work, household
work and childcare- together with wages and employment of both parents. The model
allows for corner solutions, as well as for continuous time decisions. This model is
substantially more general than earlier empirical studies in this area.
We use information on market wages and household non-labour income, which is also
new in the empirical literature, since few time-use datasets contain all of these variables
as well as collecting diary information on both spouses’ time choices.
Let tijk denote the time spent on activity j(j = 1, ..., 3) by household member k(k =
m, f) of household i(i = 1, ..., N). The time spent on any given activity depends on
the wage rates wim and wif of the husband and wife, household non-labour income µi,
observed characteristics xik, and an error term ǫijk:
t∗ijk = α
m
jk lnwim + α
f
jk lnwif + ψjkµi + x
′
ikβjk + ǫijk
tijk = t
∗
ijk if t
∗
ijk > 0
tijk = 0 otherwise i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., 3, k = m, f
(11)
This system of equations allows zero time to be spent on a given activity. Individuals
may spend no time on not only market employment, but also housework and childcare
(see Section 4).
We then specify the following wage equations:
lnwik = z
′
ikη + uik, i = 1, ..., N, k = m, f (12)
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Since the wage rates in Equation 11 may be correlated with the error terms ǫijk due to
selection on unobservables -which may aﬀect both wages and the time-allocation choices
of spouses- we allow for non-zero correlations between the error terms in the time-use and
the wage equations. Since wages are only observed for people who are formally employed,
we assign wages to non-employed spouses by specifying the joint density function for
time use and wages, and then integrating over wage rates for spouses for whom wages
were not observed, when writing down the likelihood function to be maximized (see the
Appendix).
Estimating Equations 11 and 12 simultaneously and allowing for correlation in the
error terms may be insuﬃcient to correct for the selectivity of wages on the basis of
employment status. Wages are based on reported continuous earnings and usual hours
of work from the individual questionnaire, while paid work time is measured here using
the diary information, like for housework and childcare time.7 Thus, we estimate simul-
taneously an equation for the employment status of each spouse, based on their answer
to a standard question on labour market status from the individual questionnaire. This
also allows us to control for demand-side factors, by using the regional unemployment
rate. We deﬁne employment as eik, with eik = 1 if spouse k of household i is employed,
and zero otherwise.
e∗ik = q
′
ikγk + νik
eik = 1 if e
∗
ik > 0
eik = 0 otherwise
(13)
Finally, we allow the errors of the employment equation (Equation 13) to be correlated
with the errors of the time-use equations (Equation 11) and the wage equations (Equation
12), by deﬁning:
ωi = (ǫ
′
im, ǫ
′
if , νim, νif , uim, uif)
′ (14)
7 It was the interviewer who established the day of the week on which the time diary was to be
answered. We exclude from the analysis sample observations where the diary was filled in on special
days, like a vacation, sickness leave day, wedding, etc. We also analyze separately couples who answered
the diary during a week day, excluding those that answered the diary over weekend days. For consistency
with the analysis of the time allocated to childcare and housework, which is only collected via the time
diary, we also use information on market hours reported in the diary. See the next section for more
details.
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We assume that:
ωi ∼ N(0,Σ) (15)
where Σ is the unrestricted variance-covariance matrix of dimension 10 × 10 of the
errors of this equation system. By letting the covariance matrix Σ be unrestricted and
estimating all of its elements, we allow for the simultaneity of spouses’ time-allocation
choices and wages. Correlation in unobservables between the time-use equations may
arise from unobserved household-speciﬁc correlations in preferences (i.e. unobserved
positive assortative matching eﬀects), or productivity (someone who is productive in
the labour market may also be productive in housework, or the opposite, if labour
market attachment prevents individuals from accumulating housework experience), and,
following the theoretical model, household-speciﬁc heterogeneity in market prices for
housework and child care services.
The complete model now consists of six time-use equations (Equation 11), two em-
ployment equations (Equation 13), two wage equations (Equation 12) and the joint
density (Equation 15) of the errors. We can then construct the likelihood contribution
for each type of observation. To deal with the multidimensionality of the model, we
employ simulated maximum-likelihood estimation (see Appendix B for details of this
procedure).
4 The French time-use data
The data for the analysis are drawn from the 1998-99 French time-use survey (Enqueˆte
Emploi du temps), carried out by the National Statistical Oﬃce (INSEE).
This survey covers about 8000 representative households, and includes over 20,000
individuals of all ages from 0 to 103 years. Three questionnaires were collected: a
household questionnaire, an individual questionnaire and the time diary. The diary
was collected for all individuals in the household, which is an advantage over many
other surveys that only have information on one randomly drawn individual in each
household. The diary was ﬁlled in for one day, which was chosen by the interviewer and
could be either a week or a weekend day. Another advantage of this dataset is that it
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collects information on household income, individual earnings, and usual hours of work
in addition to the diary.
For our analysis, we select only two-parent households: lone parents were dropped
from the sample. We selected married or cohabiting spouses according to the following
criteria:
- the couple was heterosexual;
- both spouses were under 60 -this being the retirement age in France in 1998-99;
- both spouses had ﬁlled in the time diary;
- neither spouse had ﬁlled in the time diary on an ‘exceptional day’, deﬁned as a special
occasion such as a vacation day, a marriage or a party etc;
- neither spouse was self-employed; and
- the number of children (aged 18 or under) was positive;
Dropping single people made the sample size to shrink from 8186 to 5287 households
while eliminating older couples reduced it from 5287 to 3819 households. There was only
one homosexual couple, which we deleted. Next, we dropped 245 couples where either
the husband or the wife had not ﬁlled the diary and 295 that had ﬁlled in the diary on
an exceptional day. Applying the last two conditions above, produced a sample of 1473
two-parent couples, including spouses who answered the diary question at the weekend.
Excluding this latter group, gives a sample of 1080 two-parent couples.
The age of children was constructed using the individual ﬁle information on the age of
the children: everyone in the household was asked to complete the individual question-
naire. Education dummies are increasing in education level, with the omitted category
being individuals without any formal educational qualiﬁcations. Regional dummies were
included in the data using the regional unemployment rate for 1998, according to the
BIT deﬁnition. These unemployment rates vary considerably across regions, from 7% in
Alsace to 17% in Languedoc-Roussillon. The unemployment rate in the region of Paris
(Ile-de-France), was just over 10%.
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All earnings and income information in the survey was collected in French Francs
(equal to 1/6.55957 Euros). Information on monthly gross earnings was collected both
as a continuous variable and in intervals, for respondents who did not provide continuous
earnings information. For them, we set earnings equal to the mid-point of each interval,
and to the lower bound of the top interval. However, to construct the hourly wage rate,
we consider only observations providing information on continous wages (roughly half of
those who reported earnings). This produced hourly wages for 797 men and 533 women,
of whom 577 men and 371 women did not answer the diary at the weekend.
Total household income before taxes was collected, though only in intervals. We set
total household income (measured on a monthly basis) equal to the mid-point of each
interval and equal to the lower bound of that interval for individuals in the top bracket.
The resulting total household income ﬁgure was compared to the sum of the spouses’
work earnings. If total household income was less than spouses’ total earnings, it was
set equal to the latter: this occurred in very few cases. Non-labour income was then set
equal to the diﬀerence between total household income and total household earnings, if
any. There is no information in the survey on after-tax income and earnings. Therefore,
gross measures are used for the analysis. With respect to unemployment beneﬁts, 10%
of the households in the sample received some income from unemployment beneﬁts, but
they were the main source of income for only 2%. About 2% of the sample received
welfare beneﬁts. We used a series of variables describing the source of household income
to instrument non-labour income (see the discussion in Appendix C).
We constructed a series of dummies measuring the skill content of the occupation
based on the occupational classiﬁcation of the individuals. Because some of the women
in the sample probably never worked, this was not available for about ten per cent of
the wives in the sample (the estimation results were not substantially aﬀected if these
couples were dropped from the analysis).
For the diary information, the following should be noted:
- The interviewer chose the day for the diary to be ﬁlled in.
- Activities were recorded every ten minutes over a 24-hour period.
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- Main and secondary activities were coded. These latter are activities carried out
simultaneously, such as cooking and watching the children, with the respondent
deciding which activity was primary and which secondary.
- Around 140 main activity categories and 100 secondary activity categories were deﬁned
by the survey designers.
Here we only consider main activities. Only for childcare, did we compare the re-
sponses computed including both main and secondary activities. We sum total time
spent on various activities, so that for example diﬀerent spells of childcare time were
added up to calculate total childcare time over the whole diary day.
We distinguish the following activities:
- Doing paid work, whether at home or at the oﬃce
- Childcare time, including taking (or time spent going with) the children somewhere
and playing with the children.
- Household work, including cleaning, shopping, cooking, doing the laundry, washing up
dishes, setting the table, and doing paperwork-where this last variable included,
by sample design construction, time spent going to administrative oﬃces.
- Household work as above and including also semi-leisure time, deﬁned as making jam,
knitting, gardening, household repairs, and taking pets out.
- Leisure time, including personal care time, own time and sleeping time.
5 Descriptive statistics
Sample descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2, both including and excluding
couples who answered the diary at the weekend. The distribution of time use of the two
spouses is shown in Table 3, for the whole sample, and in Table 4, excluding couples who
answered the diary at the weekend.
About 80% of the couples in the sample were married and 26% had young children,
aged less than three years. Roughly 20% lived in the region of Paris (Ile de France)
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but only 2% actually resided in inner Paris. Roughly 93% of the parents in the sample
were French nationals. The average gross hourly wage rate was ten Euros for men and
8 Euros for women.
It is striking that about 50% of women and 75% of men did not spend any time with
their children on the day the diary was ﬁlled in (restricting the sample to couples with
young children, aged under three, produces lower ﬁgures of 3% for women and 34% for
men, but with a far smaller sample size of 353 couples).
Women and, to a lesser extent, men perform more housework than childcare: at the
median, women spend 50 minutes on childcare and 220 on housework, in the diary day;
men spend 0 time on children and 30 minutes doing housework. This picture does not
change much if a deﬁnition of childcare time including secondary activities is used. This
is obviously due to the fact that 50% of the women in the sample did not perform any
paid work. In addition to this, in France, childcare facilities, as well as maternal and
elementary schools, are open about ten hours a day, which certainly reduces the time
parents will spend with their children. It is, instead, likely that the presence of children in
the household considerably increases the amount of time that people spend on activities
such as shopping, cooking, washing up dishes and cleaning the house, which are diﬃcult
to delegate to others.
Interestingly, housework by men increases considerably if a broader deﬁnition of house-
work is adopted, including repairs, gardening and taking out pets; while the amount of
housework carried out by women is left almost unchanged.
The distribution of the husband’s share in the total time allocated by each two-parent
couple to given activities in the day the diary was collected is shown in Table 5, for the
whole sample, and in Table 6, excluding couples who answered the diary at the weekend.
Husbands account for a large share of paid work: husbands do all of the paid work in half
of all couples. On the other hand, wives do a lot more of housework and childcare than
do their husbands, although 10% of the husbands in our sample report more housework
and childcare than their wives. All this, of course, depends on the particular day the
diary was ﬁlled in, but since observations where the diary was ﬁlled in on an ‘exceptional’
day were dropped from the sample, we can reasonably assume that these refer to fairly
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‘representative’ days.
This evidence underlines the importance of modelling spouses’ choice of time alloca-
tion taking non-participation into account, as we do in the empirical model. In particular,
non-participation in paid work falls considerably for husbands when couples answering
the diary at the weekend are excluded. We therefore focus on this sub-sample for the
estimation of the model, in order to better capture the impact of wage rates on time
allocation choices (see Table 7 and following). On the other hand, spouses spend more
time on childcare and housework at weekends. We therefore also show model estimation
results for the full sample in the Appendix (Tables A and B).
Finally, the correlation of usual hours of paid work, according to the individual ques-
tionaire, and diary paid work time is stronger when observations answering the diary
at the weekend are excluded -and equal, respectively, to 0.53 for husbands and 0.71 for
wives.
6 Estimation Results
The estimation results of the model for the sub-sample of couples answering the diary
on a week day are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9.8 The correlations of the error terms
of the wage equations and the other equations of the model are, generally, signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the importance of allowing for simultaneity.
6.1 Wage rates and non-labour income
The expected eﬀects of changes in own and spouse’s wage, and non-labour income, on
spouses’ time allocation were summarized in Table 1. Table 7 shows the estimation
results. The husband’s wage rate has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on his market
work, and a negative eﬀect on his non-market time. In particular, the eﬀect of the
husband’s wage on own childcare is negative -although signiﬁcant only at the ten per
8 Table 8 shows the estimates of the employment and wage equations. Employment increases signif-
icantly with occupational skills. The employment of women falls with the number of children. Greater
non-labour income reduces employment for both men and women. The unemployment rate attracts
a negative sign for both men and women, but its coefficient is not significant. Wage rates increase
significantly with education and occupational skills.
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cent level, suggesting that the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect (see Table
1). The eﬀect of the husband’s own wage on housework is also negative, as expected.
Interestingly, the higher the wife’s wage rate, the more time her husband spends on
housework and childcare. However, women’s childcare time is not sensitive to the own
wage or to their husband’s wage, suggesting here little scope for substitution of parents’
time into the household production function. It is, instead, plausible that a higher female
wage rate implies more negotiating power within the household, resulting thus in a little
more housework and childcare being carried out by men.
There is a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of women’s wages on their own paid work,
as expected. The response of women’s paid-work to their husband’s wage is negative,
but not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of women’s wages on own housework time is negative, as
predicted, but insigniﬁcant. We ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant negative impact of women’s wages
on own child care time.
Non-labour income has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the market labour supply of
both parents, as predicted by the theory (see Table 1). The evidence generally supports
the prediction that the income eﬀect is positive: the estimated eﬀect of non-labour
income on childcare time is also positive. The estimated impact of non-labour income
on non-market time is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for men; it is positive but
insigniﬁcant for women. For men, this is at odds with the zero prediction in Table 1,
which is based on the standard assumptions that housework does not enter the utility
function and that housework services bought in the market are perfect substitutes for
home production. This suggests that individuals may enjoy the time spent, for example,
cooking or shopping or checking their ﬁnancial accounts, or may not perceive the market
alternative as a perfect substitute for home consumption.
These ﬁndings are robust to using a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of housework, including
‘semi-leisure activities’ (see Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14). They are also robust to a diﬀerent
sample selections, including spouses that answered the time-diary over a weekend (see
Table A in the Appendix) and to using a diﬀerent deﬁnition of housework and including
weekend-days diaries (see Table B in the Appendix). Moreover, they are robust to some
sensitivity checks for possible measurement error in non-labour income (see Tables C
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and D).
6.2 Elasticities
To gain further insight into the impact of wage rates and non-labour income on time
allocation decisions, we have computed the reponse of time use to a 1% rise in wages, in
terms of elasticities (see Table 10).9 We also compute the impact of a change in wages
on the total time allocated by spouses in each household on a given activity, by summing
the husband’s and wife’s time.
We conclude that parents’ paid work is more sensitive to their own wage than to their
spouse’s wage, in line with the ﬁndings in the labour-supply literature. In particular,
the estimated cross-wages elasticities are very close to zero. The own wage elasticity is
much larger for women than men: an increase of 1% in the wage rate of women would
increase their market labour supply by 1.4%, against 0.4% for the own-wage response of
market work of men. An increase in non-labour income leads to a drop of paid work.
The elasticity of paid-work time of both spouses to non-labour income is signiﬁcantly
negative but small.
The own-wage elasticity of husbands’ housework is signiﬁcantly negative, and the
cross-wage elasticity is signiﬁcantly positive. Increasing women’s wage rate by 1% would
lead to 0.5% more housework by men. The own-wage elasticity of women’s housework
is also signiﬁcantly negative, but the cross-wage elasticity is almost zero. Non-labour
income has a small and positive impact on husbands’ housework, but this eﬀect is in-
signiﬁcant for women.
Finally, the own wage elasticity of childcare is not statistically signiﬁcant for either
parent but the cross-wage elasticity is positive and strongly signiﬁcant for fathers. An
increase of 1% in the wage rate of women would increase their husbands’ chidlcare time
by 0.6%. However, the wage elasticity for the household as a whole is negative and not
9 We simulated the model given by Equation (11) 1000 times, using observed wages, whenever
available, and simulated wages otherwise. To compute the elasticity of time allocation with respect
to the husband’s wage, we increase all husbands’ wages by 1% and simulate the model again. We
thus record the change in time for each activity for both men and women and compute the elasticity.
The procedure is repeated for an increase in the wife’s wages and, alternatively, non-labour income.
The standard errors illustrate the variation in the elasticity which results from the use of parameter
estimates.
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signiﬁcant: the childcare time of men reacts positively to changes in the wage of their
wife, but the total time spent on child care at the household level is not much aﬀected.
The elasticity of childcare time with respect to non-labour income is small and positive.
It is statistically signiﬁcant for women but less so for men.
Estimating the model adopting a broader deﬁnition of housework, which includes
‘semi-leisure’ activities, and/or using the full sample, including spouses that answered
the diary at the weekend, did not aﬀect substantially the results of estimation (see,
respectively, Table 14, and Tables A and B in the Appendix to the paper). These
ﬁndings are also robust to some sensitivity checks for possible measurement error in
non-labour income (see Appendix C, Tables C and D).
6.3 Effects of the other covariates on the time use allocation
A number of remarks are worth making regarding the impact of the other covariates
(see Table 7). First, housework time by women, is positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by marital status and the number of children while this is not so for men.10 Residing
in the region of Paris (‘Ile-de-France’) signiﬁcantly reduces the amount of time women
spend on housework.11 Age and education do not directly inﬂuence the housework time
of parents, with the exception of women with the highest education level who seem to
spend more time on housework, compared to the reference category -but this eﬀect is
only signiﬁcant at the ten per cent level.
The presence of children aged under three in the household signiﬁcantly increases
the time that parents spend on childcare. However, the estimated coeﬃcient is twice
as large for women as for men. In addition to this, the number of children signiﬁcantly
increases the time mothers spend with children or doing housework and reduces their
market work, but the impact is not signiﬁcant for men.
Higher-educated and older parents spend signiﬁcantly more time caring for their chil-
10We do not make any attempt here to control for possible endogeneity of marital and fertility as there
is no obvious way to do so. However, notice that all couples in our sample have children (by selection),
20% of them are not married and 26% have young children, aged less than three years. See El Lnhga
and Moreau (2007) for an account of the differences in time allocation of married and unmarried couples
in Germany.
11 The effect for men is also significantly negative, when a broader definition of housework is adopted
(see Table 11). This is likely to reflect lifestyle differences.
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dren, with age having a non-linear impact (where the peak is reached at age 33 for men
and 26 for women) and education showing the largest eﬀect for the highest educated.
Interestingly, French nationality aﬀects signiﬁcantly and positively the market work of
both parents but has no impact on non-market activities, possibly reﬂecting diﬃculties or
discrimination against non-French nationals in the labour market rather than individual
time choices.12
Living in small neighborhoods does not aﬀect parents’ time allocation. This may be
because small neighborhoods are often located fairly close to big towns in France (in the
sense of often being suburbs of towns), so that there is not much geographical dispersion
in terms of mentality and culture.
6.4 Correlation in unobservables between time uses
The empirical model allows the errors of the three time-use equations, and the wage and
employment equations of the spouses within each household to be correlated with each
other. Table 9 shows the estimates of these correlations and their standard deviations.
Correlations in unobservables are important in this type of model as they may capture
factors like positive assortative mating and/or polarization of spouses’ behaviour due
to unobservable characteristics. For example, individuals may marry others who have
similar (unobservable) characteristics -reﬂecting positive assortative mating- or both
parents may like to work longer hours in market work -in line with the polarization of
long hours of work at the household level, and contrary to the ‘specialization’ of one
spouse in market work and the other in housework.
In the husband’s time-use equations, unobservables in paid work correlate negatively
with unobservables in non-market activities. This negative correlation is the strongest
for housework time. This suggests that there are unobservable characteristics that either
select men into market activities or into non-market activities. The correlation between
the errors of childcare and housework for men is positive, indicating that husbands who
perform more housework also tend to spend more time caring for children. For women,
12 The French nationality dummy in the employment equation is positive and strongly significant for
women, but insignificant for men (see Table 8).
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we also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between the unobservables in paid work
and non-market activities, while the unobservables of childcare and housework time are
positively correlated.
Regarding the correlations between the two spousal equations, there is a positive
relationship between husband’s and wife’s paid work, supporting the ‘polarization’ hy-
pothesis that in some households everyone works longer hours, and in others fewer. The
unobservables in husband’s and wife’s wages are also signiﬁcantly and positively corre-
lated, so that there are common unobserved factors which drive up both spouses’ market
wages. Positive assortative mating, deﬁned as a positive correlation between spouses’
socio-economic characteristics, may lie behind these correlations.
Interestingly, the unobservables in the equation for the wife’s paid work time correlate
positively and signiﬁcantly with the unobservables in husband’s childcare time, suggest-
ing that when the husband has an unobserved willingness or productivity to take care
of children, his wife increases her paid work.
Finally, there is a signiﬁcantly positive association between the unobservables in the
time parents in each household spend on childcare. Since parental care is expected
to increase children’s human capital, this may have particular implications for welfare.
The errors of spouses’ housework equations are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated,
but only if a diﬀerent deﬁnition of housework is adopted, which includes ‘semi-leisure’
activities, like doing household repairs, gardening and taking out pets (see Table 13).
7 Conclusions
This paper is focused on the time allocation of parents and on the impact of economic
incentives.
We set up a stylized theoretical model of spouses’ utility maximization that enables us
to single out the theoretical predictions concerning wage and non-labour income eﬀects
on the supplies of market and non-market time. We distinguish three sorts of non-market
time: leisure, childcare and housework.
The empirical model we specify is suﬃciently general that we can test the validity
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of the predictions of the theoretical model. We simultaneously allow for a three-way
time-use choice by spouses within each household, allowing for non-participation in each
of them. Wage and employment equations are also estimated simultaneously. We exploit
the richness of information collected by the 1998-99 French time-use survey to estimate
the model. This asks questions on individual earnings, usual hours of work and total
household income, in addition to collecting diary information on how household members
allocate time to diﬀerent activities. The time diary was collected for all individuals in
the household, so that we have time-use information for both spouses in a couple.
The results of estimation generally conﬁrm the theoretical predictions, with the main
exception of the ﬁnding that non-labour income positively aﬀects husbands’ housework,
thus not validating the standard hypothesis that individuals do not derive utility from
housework. We conclude that parents’ market time responds positively to changes in
own wage, but not to their spouse’s wage. The own wage elasticity of housework of
fathers is signiﬁcantly negative, while the cross-wage elasticity is positive and strongly
signiﬁcant. Women’s housework responds negatively to changes in own wage but not
to the husband’s wage. Childcare time of parents does not react to own wage, but the
cross-wage elasticity of childcare time is signiﬁcantly positive for fathers. However, total
household childcare time is not responsive to changes in the wage of either spouse.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative elasticities of spouses’ paid work time to non-labour
income, although the size of these elasticities is not particularly large. The elasticity of
total housework done by the spouses to non-labour income is positive and signiﬁcant at
the ten per cent level, and that of total childcare is also positive and strongly signiﬁcant.
There are signiﬁcant and positive correlations across the errors of the two spouses’
childcare equations. Since time spent with children by parents very likely adds to the
children’s human capital, this may increase overall inequality, especially as we also ﬁnd
that higher educated parents allocate signiﬁcantly more time to childcare.
The correlations in spousal unobservable components are also positive and signiﬁcant
for paid work, wages, and for housework -if a diﬀerent deﬁnition is adopted, includ-
ing semi-leisure activities. Positive assortative mating, deﬁned as a positive correlation
between spouses’ socio-economic characteristics, may lie behind these correlations: indi-
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viduals marry with others who have similar unobservable characteristics.
Finally, we conclude that higher-educated and older parents spend more time with
their children and that formal marriage increases housework carried out by women.
References
Apps, P (2003), “Gender, Time Use and Models of the Household”, IZA
Working Paper No. 796, June.
Apps, P and Rees, R. (2002), “Household production, full consumption and
the costs of children”, Labour Economics, Vol. 8, pp.621-648.
Apps, P. F. and Rees, R. (1997), “Collective Labor Supply and Household
Production”, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 178-190.
Apps, P. F. and Rees, R. (1996), “Labor Supply, Household Production and
Intra-Family Welfare Distribution”, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 199-
209.
Becker, G. S. (1965), “A Theory of the Allocation of Time”, The Economic
Journal, Vol. 75, No. 299, pp. 493-517.
Becker, G. S. (1981), “A Treatise on the Family”, Cambridge Ma: Harvard
University Press.
Bo¨rsch-Supan, A. and V. Hajivassiliou (1993), “Smooth unbiased multivari-
ate probability simulators for maximum likelihood estimation of limited
dependent variable models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 58, nr. 3,
pp.347-368.
Chiappori, P. -A. (1997),“Introducing Household Production in Collective
Models of Labour Supply, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1,
pp. 191-209.
Connelly R. and Kimmel J. (2007), “Spousal Inﬂuences on Parents Non-
Market Time Choices, IZA DP No. 2894
23
El Lahga A.R. and Moreau N. (2007), “The Eﬀects of Marriage on Couples
Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours, IZA DP No.
2619
Gronau, R. (1976), “Leisure, Home Production and Work. The theory of the
allocation of time revisited”, NBER Working paper No. 137, May.
Hersch, J. and Stratton, L. S.(1994), “Housework, Wages, and the Division
of Housework Time for Employed Spouses”, American Economic Review,
Vol. 84, 2, pp. 120-125.
Kalenkoski, S., Ribar, D. S., and Stratton, L. S.(2008), “The inﬂuence of
wages on parents’ allocation of time to child care and market work in the
United Kingdom”, Journal of Population Economics, forthcoming.
Kooreman, P. and Kapteyn, A. (1987), “A disaggregated analysis of the
allocation of time within the household”, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 95, No.2, pp. 223-249.
OECD (2001), Employment Outlook, “Balancing Work and Family Life:
Helping Parents into Paid Employment, Chapter 4.
Pollak, R. A. (2005), “Bargainaing Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates
and Household Production”? NBER Working Paper No. 11239, March.
A First-order conditions for solving the model
The household maximizes the function speciﬁed in Equation 8 subject to the constraints
given by Equations 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. Let λB be the Lagrange multiplier for the
household budget constraint, Equation 7. We have the following ﬁrst-order conditions:13
λ
∂Um
∂Cm
= λB (16)
13 The equations may be augmented with Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the non-negativity of time
use, consumption and the production of services. For reasons of conciseness, we abstain from writing
down the full set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions for non-negativity of outcomes. Rather, we highlight the
interpretation of the first order conditions.
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(1− λ)
∂Uf
∂Cf
= λB (17)
λ
∂Um
∂Cd
+ (1− λ)
∂Uf
∂Cd
= λBpd, d = h, c (18)
λ
∂Um
∂t3m
+ λBpc
∂gc
∂t3m
= λBwm (19)
(1− λ)
∂Uf
∂t3f
+ λBpc
∂gc
∂t3f
= λBwf (20)
λ
∂Um
∂lm
= λBwm (21)
(1− λ)
∂Uf
∂lf
= λBwf (22)
∂gh
∂t2k
=
wk
ph
, k = m, f (23)
Note that housework times t2m and t2f are set by Equation 23 such that the marginal
productivity of time spent on housework is equal to the relative wage for both spouses. A
corner solution at zero hours may occur for high wage-low productivity spouses. Having
solved for t2m and t2f , Chh follows from Equation 3. Note that Equations 16 through
22, all implicitly deﬁne ‘marginal-rate-of-substitution equals price ratio’ relations. The
Equations 16 through 22, together with the budget constraint, Equation 7, can be used
to solve for private consumption Cm and Cf , household services Chm bought from the
market, childcare times t3m and t3f , and child services, Cch and Ccm (using Equations 2
and 4), leisure values lm and lf , and the multiplier λB. Time spent on work follows from
the time constraint Equation 6.
Equations 19 and 20 suggest that time caring for children not only depends on pro-
ductivity and market prices (which also applies to housework time, Equation 23), but
also on the resulting utility. If the marginal utility of the time spent caring for the chil-
dren is positive, Equations 19 and 20 imply that the wage is larger than the marginal
revenue product of childcare time. If the production function 4 has positive, but di-
minishing marginal productivity, this implies that someone who attaches positive utility
to childcare time will spend more time on childcare than someone that does not value
childcare (who has then zero marginal utility).
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B Likelihood contributions
To deal with the multidimensional integration of the likelihood contributions, we estimate
the model by simulated maximum likelihood, using the GHK algorithm (see, for instance,
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993), proceeding as follows.
We write the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the errors of the time-use, employment
and wage equations as:
Σ =
(
A C ′
C Ω
)
(24)
with
Ω = Euiu
′
i, ui =
(
uim
uif
)
, C = Eui

ǫim
ǫif
νim
νif

′
, A = E

ǫim
ǫif
νim
νif


ǫim
ǫif
νim
νif

′
(25)
The joint density of the errors of the time-use equations (Equation 11) and the employ-
ment equations (Equation 13), conditional on the errors of the wage equations (Equation
12), is normal with mean Bi and variance-covariance matrix Z, with:
Bi = C
′Ω−1ui, Z = A− C
′Ω−1C (26)
Let L be the lower-triangular matrix implicitly deﬁned by:
LL′ = Z (27)
with typical element ljs, j = 1, ...8, s = 1, ..., j. For each household, we draw R inde-
pendent random numbers u∗isr, i = 1, ..., N, s = 1, ..., 7, r = 1, ..., R from the uniform
distribution over the range (0, 1). These random numbers are used to recursively simu-
late the likelihood contributions for the time-use equations of the husband, the time-use
equations of the wife, and the employment equations of husband and wife. We initially
assume that wages wim and wif are observed. Let litmjr denote the simulated likeli-
hood contribution for the j-th time use (j = 1, 2, 3) of the husband in household i, and
replication r. If the husband reports no time spent on time use j (j = 1, 2, 3) we set14
litmjr = Φ
−αmjm lnwim + αfjm lnwif + x′imβjm +∑j−1s=1 ljsνisr
ljj
 (28)
14 We define the summation
∑
0
s=1
≡ 0.
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and
νijr = Φ
−1(litmjru
∗
ijr) (29)
where Φ(.) represents the standard normal distribution function. If the husband reports
a positive amount of time spent on activity j, we set litmjr =
1
ljj
φ
tijm − [αmjm lnwim + αfjm lnwif + x′imβjm +∑j−1s=1 ljsνisr]
ljj
 (30)
where φ(.) is the standard normal density function, and
νijr =
tijm − [α
m
jm lnwim + α
f
jm lnwif + x
′
imβjm +
∑j−1
s=1 ljsνisr]
ljj
(31)
We take an analogous approach for the time use of the wife. If the wife reports no time
spent on activity j, we determine:
litfjr = Φ
−αmjf lnwim + αfjf lnwif + x′ifβjf +∑j+3−1s=1 ljsνisr
lj+3,j+3
 (32)
and
νi,j+3,r = Φ
−1(litfjru
∗
i,j+3,r) (33)
If the wife reports a positive amount of time spent on activity j, we have litfjr =
1
lj+3,j+3
φ
tijf − [αmjf lnwim + αfjf lnwif + x′ifβjf +∑j+3−1s=1 ljsνisr]
lj+3,j+3
 (34)
and
νi,j+3,r =
tijf − [α
m
jf lnwim + α
f
jf lnwif + x
′
ifβjf +
∑j+3−1
s=1 ljsνisr]
lj+3,j+3
(35)
The likelihood contribution for the employment status of the husband, denoted by liemr,
is equal to, for a non-employed husband:
liemr = Φ
(
−
q′imγm +
∑6
s=1 l7sνisr
l77
)
(36)
and
νi7r = Φ
−1(liemru
∗
i7r) (37)
For an employed husband, it is equal to:
liemr = 1− Φ
(
−
q′imγm +
∑6
s=1 l7sνisr
l77
)
(38)
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νi7r = Φ
−1((1− liemr) + liemru
∗
i7r) (39)
For the employment of the wife, we set the likelihood contribution liefr if she is nonem-
ployed equal to:
liefr = Φ
(
−
q′ifγf +
∑
7
s=1 l8sνisr
l88
)
(40)
If she is employed, we set this equal to:
liefr = 1− Φ
(
−
q′ifγf +
∑7
s=1 l8sνisr
l88
)
(41)
Next, we set the simulated likelihood contribution of household i, for replication r of
the time-use equations and employment status equal to lir, where
lir =
3∏
j=1
litmjrlitfjrliemrliefr (42)
This is then averaged over replications to yield:
li =
1
R
R∑
r=1
lir (43)
In the empirical application we set R = 60.
Were neither the wage rates of the husband or the wife to be observed, before com-
puting the above likelihood contributions we simulated their wages wimr and wifr, by
drawing them from their joint distribution, (deﬁned by Equation(12) and ui ∼ N(0,Ω)),
and then plugged them into the simulated likelihood contributions listed above. If the
wage rate of the husband is observed, but that of his wife is not, we draw the wife’s
wage rate, wifr, from the distribution of wif , conditional on wim, and plug it into the
simulated likelihood contribution, as above. The likelihood contribution was completed
by multiplying Equation 43 by the marginal density of the husband’s wage rate. For
households, where, on the contrary, the wife’s wage rate was observed but the husband’s
was not, we proceed similarly. If both wage rates are observed, we multiply the simu-
lated likelihood contribution Equation 43 by the joint density function of the wife’s and
husband’s wage rates.
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C Additional robustness checks: allowing for mea-
surement error in non-labour income
Additional sensitivity checks were performed to test whether any possible correlation of
non-labour income with the error terms of the time-use equations aﬀects the outcomes
of the model. Since non-labour income is the diﬀerence between total household income
and the sum of the earnings of the spouses, possible measurement error in earnings may
aﬀect non-labour income as well. Re-estimating the model without non-labour income
provides a ﬁrst check. If measurement error in non-labour income is important, it will
also aﬀect the parameter estimates of the other variables, and in particular the wage
elacticities of the time uses. We have re-estimated the model for our base variant (week
diaries only, conventional deﬁnition of housework time). The resulting elasticities are
shown in Table C in the Appendix.15 We conclude that there are no large diﬀerences in
the estimated elasticities when including (Table 10) or excluding (Table C) non-labour
income. The most aﬀected are the elasticities of the housework time of the husband,
which are smaller when non-labour income is dropped from the model. However, on
the basis of the conﬁdence intervals for the diﬀerent estimates of the elasticities, the
elasticities are well within each other’s conﬁdence intervals.
Next to this, we have instrumented non-labour income. To avoid the weak instru-
ments problem, we have done ﬁrst stage regressions to select predictors for non-labour
income. We use than a dummy for the presence of ‘housing and ﬁnancial rents’ and ‘other
revenues’ as a source of household income; and a dummy variable indicating whether
the household has positive non-labour income.16 Next, we have added this equation for
non-labour income to the system of Equations 11, 12, and 13, and we estimated this
extended system simultaneously.17 The joint system allows for correlation between the
15 A full set of estimates is available from the authors upon request.
16 This dummy indicator is much less sensitive to possible measurement error in earnings than the the
continuous measure of non-labour income. Without this indicator, the R-squared of the regression for
non-labour income did not exceed 0.05, which makes it virtually impossible to instrument non-labour
income, as with such a low R-squared the non-labour income strongly correlates with its residual.
Including the indicator for positive non-labour income increases the R-squared to 0.27.
17 The equation for non-labour income is purely meant as a statistical, ‘instrumental’, equation. We do
not interpret it as a ‘structural’ equation, representing the formation of non-labour income. The latter
is a topic beyond the scope of this static time allocation framework. We included the aforementioned
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errors of the equation for non-labour income and the errors of the time-use equations,
the employment equations, and the wage equations. We did a likelihood ratio rest to test
the null hypothesis that the (ten) correlation coeﬃcients are (jointly) equal to zero. In
particular, we are interested in the sign and signiﬁcance of the correlations between the
errors of the equation for non-labour income and the time-use equations: non-zero corre-
lations would suggest that measurement error in non-labour income may bias the results.
The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is 31.4. The critical value for a chi-squared
test statistic with 10 degrees of freedom is 18.3. Thus, the null hypothesis that the entire
vector of correlation coeﬃcients between the errors of the equation for non-labour income
and the errors of the rest of the system is equal to zero is rejected. However, inspection
of the separate correlation coeﬃcients shows that only two correlation coeﬃcients have
t-values larger than 2. These are the correlations between the equation for non-labour
income and the employment equations. For the remaining, only the correlation between
non-labour income and the paid work equation for women is signiﬁcant at the 10 per
cent level, according to its t-value. Six of the correlation coeﬃcients show a t-value that
is smaller than one. We next re-estimated the model, restricting the seven insigniﬁcant
correlation coeﬃcients to zero, and leaving unrestricted the correlations between the er-
rors of the equation for non-labour income, the employment equations and the equation
for paid work of women. The likelihood ratio test statistic for testing whether these 3
correlation coeﬃcients are (jointly) equal to zero takes the value 25.9, which leads to a
clear rejection at the 5 percent level (the critical value is 7.8). The likelihood ratio test
statistic for testing the validity of setting the remaining 7 correlation coeﬃcients equal
to zero, takes the value 5.5. The critical value for this test at the 5 per cent level is
14.1, so here the null hypothesis is not rejected. The correlations between the errors of
non-labour income and employment (and paid work of the wife) are positive, indicating
that there are unobservable factors that go together with both a higher employment
probability and a higher non-labour income.18 For this ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we compute
indicators for non-labour income, the logarithm of the age of the husband and its square, and the number
of children. Other regressors were not significant at the 5 percent level in the first stage regression, and
have not been included to avoid the weak instruments problem.
18 Thus, the results show that only the coefficients of non-labour income in the employment equa-
tions are biased if non-labour income is not instrumented. Without instrumenting, the coefficient of
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the wage and income elasticities of the time-use equations (see Table D). The results for
the elasticities are hardly diﬀerent from those of our preferred speciﬁcation reported in
Table 10. The largest (relative) diﬀerence is found for the elasticities of paid work of the
wife with respect to non-labour income: this elasticity gets somewhat smaller (i.e. more
negative). However, the two diﬀerent values of the elasticities would still be included in
each other’s 5 percent’s conﬁdence interval based on their standard errors.
non-labour income in the employment equation measures both a ‘true’ causal effect of non-labour in-
come on employment, which must be negative, and an offsetting positive correlation in unobservables.
Incorporating correlation of non-labour income with the error term of the employment equation gives a
smaller (i.e. more negative) coefficient of non-labour income in the employment equation, whereas the
positive effect in unobservables is captured by a positive estimate of the correlation coefficient.
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Table 1: Theoretical eﬀects of wages and non-labour income on spouses’ time allocation
Husband’s wage rate Wife’s wage rate Non-labour income
Husband, Wife Husband, Wife Husband ,Wife
Substitution effects:
Paid Work (t1) + , - - , +
Housework (t2) - ,? ?, -
Childcare time (t3) - ,? ?, -
Income effects:
Paid Work (t1) - , - - , - - , -
Housework (t2) 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0
Child time (t3) + , + + , + + , +
Total effects:
Paid Work (t1) ? , - - , ? - , -
Housework (t2) - ,? ?, - 0 , 0
Childcare time (t3) ? ,? ?, ? + , +
These eﬀects are discussed in Section 2 of the paper.
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Table 2: Sample descriptives
Variable Full Sample Excluding
weekend diaries
N =1473 N =1080
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
W Age 37.80 7.46 37.84 7.53
H Age 40.26 7.74 40.27 7.86
W Compulsory education 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
W Lower Secondary 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
W Upper Secondary 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
W University short degree 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
W University degree and higher 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29
H Compulsory education 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
H Lower Secondary 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.48
H Upper Secondary 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28
H University short degree 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
H University degree and higher 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
W High-skilled occupation 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
W Intermediary occupation 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38
W Low-Skill occupation 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50
W Unskilled occupation 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
W occupational skill n. a. 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
H High-skilled occupation 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
H Intermediary occupation 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
H Low-Skill occupation 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
H Unskilled occupation 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
Married 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.37
No. of children 1.93 1.00 1.91 0.98
Children, age < 3 0.26 0.47 0.26 0.47
Ile de France 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
Paris 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15
W French nationality 0.93 0.26 0.93 0.25
H French nationality 0.92 0.27 0.93 0.26
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Table 2: Sample descriptives (continued)
Variable Full Sample Excluding
weekend diaries
N =1473 N =1080
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
W Employed 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.48
H Employed 0.91 0.29 0.90 0.29
W Hours of work per week 18.78 17.52 18.45 17.42
H Hours of work per week 33.66 13.20 33.59 13.24
W Hours of work per week, diary 13.12 18.07 16.77 19.03
H Hours of work per week, diary 25.35 21.31 32.76 18.81
W Household work, minutes, diary 233.58 131.94 227.99 134.51
H Household work, minutes, diary 60.94 80.32 50.18 73.07
W Household work broad, diary 253.22 143.41 246.13 146.88
H Household work broad, diary 123.00 141.61 104.12 134.95
W Childcare, primary activity, diary 83.62 95.43 89.43 98.96
H Childcare, primary activity, diary 28.83 53.35 26.32 46.96
W hourly wage, Euros 8.43 5.35 8.53 5.61
H hourly wage, Euros 10.0 5.70 10.01 5.55
Household non-labour income, monthly 484.39 697.91 496.39 721.24
Regional unemployment rate 11.35 2.41
These are unweighted sample statistics.
The diary paid work activity is actually recorded in minutes per day, but we have
transformed it here in hours per week, to compare it to the standard usual hours
from the individual questionnaire.
In the econometric analysis, hours per day were entered as the dependent variable.
Wage rates are averaged over positive values only.
Wages and non-labour income are in Euros.
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Table 3: Distribution of spouses’ time allocation
Percentiles Sample
N =1473
Percentiles Paid work Childcare Housework Housework broad
Wives 1% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 40 40
10% 0 0 60 60
25% 0 0 130 140
50% 0 50 220 240
75% 390 130 330 360
90% 500 210 410 450
95% 530 270 460 510
99% 620 380 550 600
Husbands 1% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0 0
10% 0 0 0 0
25% 0 0 0 20
50% 440 0 30 70
75% 510 40 90 180
90% 590 90 170 340
95% 630 140 230 430
99% 740 250 350 600
These are unweighted sample statistics.
Table 4: Distribution of spouses’ time allocation
Percentiles Excluding weekend diaries
N =1078
Percentiles Paid work Childcare Housework Housework broad
Wives 1% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 30 30
10% 0 0 60 60
25% 0 0 130 130
50% 0 60 220 230
75% 460 140 330 350
90% 510 230 410 450
95% 540 290 460 510
99% 640 400 550 610
Husbands 1% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0 0
10% 0 0 0 0
25% 270 0 0 10
50% 480 0 20 60
75% 540 30 70 140
90% 600 90 150 310
95% 660 130 210 400
99% 750 200 340 610
These are unweighted sample statistics.
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Table 5: Share of husband’s time allocation in each couple’s total time in the activity
Percentiles Sample
N =1473
Husband’s Share of time Paid work Childcare Housework Housework (broad)
1% 0 0 0 0
5% 11.11 0 0 0
10% 50 0 0 0
25% 67.14 0 0 6.25
50% 100 12.5 13.04 26.83
75% 100 40.82 33.33 46.48
90% 100 75 51.03 61.54
95% 100 100 63.64 73.53
99% 100 100 100 100
Observations 1033 1084 1470 1471
These ratios of husband’s time over couples’ time are computed
only for couples where at least one of the two spouses participates in the activity.
Table 6: Share of husband’s time allocation in each couple’s total time in the activity
Percentiles Excluding weekend diaries
N =1078
Husband’s Share of time Paid work Childcare Housework Housework (broad)
1% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0 0
10% 41.54 0 0 0
25% 50.52 0 6.2 2.78
50% 66.05 10 10 22.65
75% 100 38.46 31.25 42.97
90% 100 72.73 50 62.5
95% 100 100 66.66 75
99% 100 100 100 100
Observations 923 817 1076 1076
These ratios of husband’s time over couples’ time are computed
only for couples where at least one of the two spouses participates in the activity.
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Table 7: Estimates of time-use equations
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080
Husbands Wives
Variable Paid House Child Paid House Child
Log wage rate 2.92** -0.92** -0.65* -1.09 -0.05 -0.07
husband (1.01) (0.41) (0.38) (0.69) (0.24) (0.23)
Log wage rate -0.05 0.74** 0.63** 8.07** -3.06** -0.67
wife (0.66) (0.24) (0.23) (2.07) (0.69) (0.47)
Intercept -71.54* -19.72 -44.19** -155.73** 25.38 -50.79**
(43.36) (17.68) (15.82) (38.91) (16.84) (11.83)
Log age 38.11 11.00 25.20** 75.75** -9.22 33.16**
(23.80) (9.71) (8.73) (21.46) (9.26) (6.73)
Log age squared -5.56 -1.43 -3.65** -10.76** 1.73 -5.11**
(3.24) (1.32) (1.19) (3.00) (1.29) (0.95)
Compulsory ed. -0.78 0.54** 0.54** 0.99 0.09 0.01
(0.71) (0.26) (0.26) (0.87) (0.29) (0.25)
Low secondary 0.04 0.20 0.40** -0.15 0.20 0.40**
(0.43) (0.18) (0.17) (0.79) (0.27) (0.20)
Upper secondary -0.47 0.25 0.53** -1.16 0.29 1.00**
(0.71) (0.30) (0.25) (1.04) (0.38) (0.25)
Univers. short -0.56 0.23 0.51 -0.91 0.72 0.69*
(0.87) (0.38) (0.32) (1.59) (0.54) (0.39)
Univers. and higher -0.83 0.57 1.05** -3.02 1.38* 1.17**
(1.06) (0.43) (0.37) (2.20) (0.75) (0.50)
Married 0.56 -0.18 -0.16 -0.41 0.52** -0.09
(0.40) (0.17) (0.17) (0.56) (0.22) (0.16)
French national 1.52** -0.11 0.21 2.55** -0.41 0.11
(0.61) (0.26) (0.25) (1.01) (0.29) (0.28)
Children, age < 3 -0.06 0.08 0.63** -1.66** -0.12 1.29**
(0.44) (0.18) (0.16) (0.62) (0.23) (0.16)
No. of children 0.22 -0.03 0.09 -1.54** 0.35** 0.52**
(0.17) (0.07) (0.07) (0.27) (0.07) (0.06)
Ile de France 0.23 -0.05 0.16 0.49 -0.46** 0.08
(0.46) (0.16) (0.15) (0.57) (0.19) (0.15)
Non-labour income -0.25** 0.04** 0.03** -0.17** 0.02 0.03**
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Rural -0.27 0.18 0.04 -0.82 0.13 0.00
(0.41) (0.16) (0.15) (0.55) (0.18) (0.16)
Non-labour income is measured in French Francs and divided by 1000.
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Table 8: Estimates of the employment and wage equations
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080
Employment Wage
equations equations
Variable Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Intercept -11.10 -36.18** 2.55 3.00
(23.87) (8.14) (2.16) (2.43)
Log age 7.67 20.10** 0.11 -0.31
(13.04) (4.55) (1.19) (1.34)
Log age squared -1.15 -2.76** 0.05 0.12
(1.77) (0.63) (0.16) (0.18)
Compulsory ed. 0.48 0.55** 0.13** 0.14**
(0.41) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
Low secondary 0.30 0.34** 0.11** 0.19**
(0.23) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03)
Upper secondary 0.73* 0.26 0.12** 0.29**
(0.39) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
Univers. short 0.47 0.32 0.25** 0.44**
(0.41) (0.22) (0.03) (0.04)
Univers. and higher 0.60 0.18 0.34** 0.58**
(0.46) (0.31) (0.03) (0.04)
Married 0.19 0.01
(0.24) (0.14)
French national 0.34 0.50**
(0.28) (0.21)
Children, age < 3 -0.30 -0.26
(0.23) (0.15)
No. of children 0.11 -0.39**
(0.08) (0.06)
Ile de France -0.13 0.14
(0.26) (0.14)
Non-labour income -0.12** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01)
Rural -0.17 -0.25**
(0.25) (0.13)
Unemployment rate -0.06 -0.03
(0.05) (0.02)
Low-skill 0.42* 0.73** 0.13** 0.09**
(0.25) (0.14) (0.02) (0.04)
Intermed.-skill 0.56** 0.95** 0.37** 0.32**
(0.28) (0.20) (0.03) (0.05)
High-skill 1.03** 1.41** 0.76** 0.65**
(0.53) (0.34) (0.03) (0.06)
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Table 9. Estimates of the covariance matrix: standard deviations and correlation coefficients
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080
Paid House Child Paid House Child Empl. Empl. Wage Wage
work work time work work time men wom. rate rate
husb. husb. husb. wife wife wife husb. wife
Paid wk husb. 4.42**
House wk husb. -0.50** 1.66**
Child tm husb. -0.20** 0.20** 1.39**
Paid wk wife 0.18** 0.01 0.16** 5.94**
House wk wife -0.09** 0.00 -0.09** -0.75** 2.15**
Child tm wife. 0.09** -0.05 0.13** -0.38** 0.18** 1.62**
Empl. husb. 0.69** -0.18** -0.16* 0.17* -0.10 0.05 1.00
Empl. wife 0.07 0.14** 0.07 0.83** -0.53** -0.29** 0.24** 1.00
Wage rt husb. -0.18** 0.15** 0.08 -0.07 0.10** 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.24**
Wage rt wife -0.05 -0.02 -0.10* -0.32** 0.33** 0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.26** 0.24**
Table 10: Elasticities
Elasticity of: Wage Wage Non-labour
husband wife income
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.41** -0.01 -0.10**
(0.14) (0.09) (0.02)
Paid work wife -0.07 1.40** -0.08**
(0.12) (0.30) (0.02)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.25** 0.47** -0.10**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.01)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.56** 0.49** 0.08**
(0.27) (0.16) (0.04)
Housework wife -0.09 -0.74** 0.01
(0.06) (0.16) (0.01)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.18** -0.51** 0.03*
(0.07) (0.13) (0.01)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.52 0.57** 0.08*
(0.34) (0.21) (0.05)
Childcare time wife -0.07 -0.31 0.04**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.02)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.17 -0.11 0.05**
(0.12) (0.18) (0.02)
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Table 11: Estimates of the time-use equations
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080, other definition of housework
Husbands Wives
Variable Paid Housewk Child Paid Housewk Child
Log wage rate 2.86** -1.93** -0.65* -1.13** -0.03 -0.06
husband (1.02) (0.60) (0.38) (0.69) (0.26) (0.22)
Log wage rate -0.03 0.52 0.61** 7.67** -3.20** -0.64
wife (0.68) (0.40) (0.23) (2.02) (0.72) (0.47)
Intercept -70.97 -18.16 -43.24** -155.34** 27.55 -50.09**
(43.45) (27.96) (15.92) (36.42) (17.81) (12.15)
Log age 37.94 11.26 24.71** 76.67** -10.26 32.65**
(23.92) (15.27) (8.80) (20.15) (9.83) (6.91)
Log age squared -5.55* -1.23 -3.58** -10.91 1.91 -5.04**
(3.25) (2.07) (1.20) (2.81) (1.36) (0.97)
Compulsory Ed. -0.73 0.53 0.55** 1.07 -0.05 0.02
(0.72) (0.42) (0.25) (0.85) (0.32) (0.25)
Low secondary -0.01 0.53** 0.40** -0.24 0.19 0.42**
(0.44) (0.27) (0.16) (0.78) (0.30) (0.20)
Upper secondary -0.58 0.65 0.52** -1.19 0.30 1.00**
(0.73) (0.44) (0.25) (1.03) (0.41) (0.26)
University, short -0.61 0.70 0.51 -0.69 0.73 0.69*
(0.89) (0.54) (0.32) (1.52) (0.57) (0.38)
Univers. and higher -0.84 0.88 1.07** -2.72 1.44* 1.13**
(1.08) (0.66) (0.37) (2.13) (0.79) (0.50)
Married 0.58 0.05 -0.17 -0.40 0.58** -0.09
(0.41) (0.25) (0.17) (0.56) (0.24) (0.16)
French national 1.50** 0.40 0.21 2.35** -0.44 0.13
(0.63) (0.38) (0.25) (1.00) (0.34) (0.28)
Children, age < 3 -0.05 0.08 0.63** -1.58** -0.20 1.29**
(0.45) (0.30) (0.16) (0.62) (0.26) (0.16)
No. of children 0.23 -0.17 0.09 -1.53** 0.34** 0.52**
(0.17) (0.11) (0.07) (0.26) (0.08) (0.06)
Ile de France 0.29 -0.61** 0.16 0.51 -0.59** 0.07
(0.47) (0.27) (0.15) (0.57) (0.22) (0.15)
Non-labour income -0.24** 0.06** 0.03** -0.18** 0.03 0.03**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Rural -0.27 0.13 0.04 -0.93* 0.15 -0.01
(0.41) (0.25) (0.15) (0.54) (0.20) (0.15)
Non-labour income is measured in French Francs and divided by 1000.
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Table 12: Estimates of the employment and wage equations
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080, other definition of housework
Employment Wage
equations equations
Variable Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Intercept -12.82 -34.89** 0.66 2.39
(23.49) (8.24) (2.23) (2.43)
Log age 8.68 19.49** 1.14 0.02
(12.81) (4.62) (1.22) (1.34)
Log age-squared -1.29 -2.68** -0.09 0.07
(1.74) (0.64) (0.17) (0.18)
Compulsory Ed. 0.41 0.55** 0.13** 0.14**
(0.43) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03)
Low secondary 0.26 0.30** 0.11** 0.20**
(0.22) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03)
Upper secondary 0.72* 0.23 0.13** 0.29**
(0.37) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
University, short 0.38 0.33 0.25** 0.44**
(0.41) (0.22) (0.03) (0.04)
Univers. and higher 0.58 0.23 0.34** 0.58**
(0.48) (0.30) (0.03) (0.04)
Married 0.15 0.03
(0.23) (0.14)
French nationality 0.36 0.48**
(0.29) (0.22)
Children, age < 3 -0.32 -0.29*
(0.23) (0.15)
No. of children 0.11 -0.39**
(0.08) (0.06)
Ile de France -0.10 0.12
(0.26) (0.14)
Non-labour income -0.12** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01)
Rural -0.17 -0.23*
(0.25) (0.12)
Unemployment rate -0.06 -0.04**
(0.05) (0.02)
Low-skill 0.40* 0.75** 0.13** 0.09**
(0.24) (0.14) (0.02) (0.04)
Intermed.-skill 0.58** 0.98** 0.37** 0.33**
(0.28) (0.20) (0.03) (0.05)
High-skill 0.98* 1.40** 0.75** 0.65**
(0.54) (0.33) (0.03) (0.06)
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Table 13. Estimates of the covariance matrix: standard deviations and correlation coefficients
Only weekday diaries, N = 1080, other definition of housework
Paid House Child Paid House Child Empl. Empl. Wage Wage
work work time work work time men wom. rate rate
husb. husb. husb. wife wife wife husb. wife
Paid wk husb. 4.45**
House wk husb. -0.66** 2.61**
Child tm husb. -0.20** 0.10** 1.38**
Paid wk wife 0.18** -0.07* 0.16** 5.86**
House wk wife -0.10** 0.11** -0.11** -0.77** 2.34**
Child tm wife. 0.10** -0.09** 0.12** -0.37** 0.15** 1.61**
Empl. husb. 0.68** -0.25** -0.15* 0.18** -0.14 0.06 1.00
Empl. wife 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.83** -0.57** -0.28** 0.24 1.00
Wage rt husb. -0.17** 0.20** 0.08 -0.06 0.09** 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.24**
Wage rt wife -0.05 0.05 -0.10* -0.31** 0.32** 0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.26** 0.24**
Table 14: Elasticities: Only weekday diaries, other deﬁnition of housework
Elasticity of: Wage Wage Non-labour
husband wife income
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.40** -0.004 -0.10**
(0.14) (0.10) (0.02)
Paid work wife -0.08 1.34** -0.08**
(0.13) (0.30) (0.03)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.24** 0.45** -0.10**
(0.11) (0.14) (0.02)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.68** 0.19 0.08**
(0.21) (0.15) (0.04)
Housework wife -0.08 -0.72** 0.02
(0.06) (0.16) (0.01)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.27** -0.43** 0.04**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.02)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.53 0.55** 0.08
(0.33) (0.22) (0.06)
Childcare time wife -0.06 -0.29 0.04**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.02)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.17 -0.10 0.05**
(0.11) (0.18) (0.02)
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Table A: Elasticities: including weekend diaries
Elasticity of: Wage Wage Non-labour
husband wife income
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.34** 0.10 -0.10**
(0.14) (0.09) (0.01)
Paid work wife -0.05 1.21** -0.08**
(0.12) (0.28) (0.02)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.21** 0.47** -0.09**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.01)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.42** 0.42** 0.07*
(0.20) (0.12) (0.04)
Housework wife -0.14** -0.56** 0.01
(0.05) (0.12) (0.01)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.20** -0.35** 0.02*
(0.06) (0.10) (0.01)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.34 0.58** 0.07*
(0.26) (0.20) (0.04)
Childcare time wife -0.01 -0.09 0.03*
(0.09) (0.17) (0.02)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.10 0.09 0.04**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.02)
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Table B: Elasticities: other deﬁnition of housework, including weekend diaries
Elasticity of: Wage Wage Non-labour
husband wife income
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.31** 0.10 -0.10**
(0.13) (0.09) (0.01)
Paid work wife -0.06 1.15** -0.08**
(0.12) (0.28) (0.03)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.19* 0.46** -0.09**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.01)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.53** 0.17 0.05**
(0.16) (0.11) (0.02)
Housework wife -0.12** -0.50** 0.02
(0.05) (0.11) (0.01)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.26** -0.28** 0.03**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.01)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.31 0.56** 0.07*
(0.27) (0.16) (0.04)
Childcare time wife -0.01 -0.10 0.03*
(0.09) (0.17) (0.02)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.09 0.08 0.04**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.02)
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Table C: Elasticities: dropping non-labour income from the model
Week diaries only
Elasticity of: Wage Wage
husband wife
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.46** -0.01
(0.15) (0.10)
Paid work wife -0.10 1.51**
(0.13) (0.32)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.29** 0.44**
(0.11) (0.15)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.45* 0.38**
(0.24) (0.15)
Housework wife -0.08 -0.69**
(0.06) (0.17)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.17** -0.43**
(0.07) (0.13)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.51 0.55**
(0.35) (0.21)
Childcare time wife -0.07 -0.31
(0.10) (0.21)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.18 -0.10
(0.12) (0.18)
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Table D: Elasticities
Allowing for correlation between non-labour income and the errors of the system
Week diaries only
Elasticity of: Wage Wage Non-labour
husband wife income
Paid work:
Paid work husband 0.42** -0.004 -0.10**
(0.14) (0.09) (0.02)
Paid work wife -0.07 1.38** -0.11**
(0.13) (0.31) (0.03)
Total paid work time, for both spouses 0.25** 0.47** -0.10**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.01)
Housework time:
Housework husband -0.56** 0.49** 0.08**
(0.27) (0.16) (0.03)
Housework wife -0.09 -0.75** 0.01
(0.06) (0.16) (0.02)
Total housework time, for both spouses -0.18** -0.51** 0.03*
(0.07) (0.14) (0.01)
Childcare time:
Childcare time husband -0.52 0.57** 0.08
(0.34) (0.21) (0.06)
Childcare time wife -0.06 -0.31 0.04**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.02)
Total childcare time, for both spouses -0.17 -0.11 0.05**
(0.11) (0.18) (0.02)
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